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ABSTRACT
Despite the popularity of soccer in Africa, African teams tend to underperform in international
competitions such as the World Cup relative to European and South American teams. Studies
have been conducted on what determines performance in international soccer. These studies
stress the importance of wealth, talent pool, and soccer culture on determining performance.
However, these studies focus more generally on the entire world, and, in some instances, omit
African nations due to a lack of data. Additionally, the focus on a wide sample of the world
results in the omission of some potentially crucial variables in relation to Africa, specifically
corruption. This paper examines the determinants of African Association soccer team success
using statistical tools employed in the literature. In addition to corruption, this study examines
wealth, talent pool, colonial heritage, and regional affiliation. The results confirm the positive
impact of wealth on performance and, contrary to some studies, showcase statistically significant
positive impact of talent pool size on performance. Furthermore, this study reflects the need for a
more direct assessment of institutional performance of soccer association generally, as well as
developing a more comprehensive model in addressing the relationship between corruption and
soccer for further investigation and thus better policy design.
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Soccer, Africa, Corruption
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the most popular sport in the world, soccer possesses a unique position in
reflecting and impacting the political and social structures of a given nation. Starting in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and in line with the development of soccer within
European societies, the sport started to diffuse into European colonies. For example, in British
African colonies, such as Gold Coast, soldiers and traders started to practice the sport in an effort
to promote discipline, teamwork and masculinity (Alegi 2010). To compete against the British
traders, all-black teams started to form. Later on, those teams became powerful tools in the hands
of independence leaders, freedom fighters, and the people to express anti-colonial sentiments and
rally for support. This pattern was recreated in other colonies throughout Africa. Since then,
soccer has become the most popular sport in the continent. As the game progressed in Europe,
South America, and elsewhere, organization of soccer in the continent started to form and
countries started to gain membership in regional and international soccer federations.
Despite the popularity of the sport in Africa, soccer in the continent faces hurdles to
development. Some suggest that African national teams have been struggling with
underdevelopment, corruption, and mismanagement, all of which have prevented them from
competing in the top level of international soccer, and to achieve success in regional
competitions (Chiweshe 2014). On the international level, although participation in the World
Cup by African teams has gone up since the inauguration of the Confederation Africain de
Football (CAF) in the 1950s, African teams still struggle to make it through advanced stages of
the competition. Underperformance of African national teams can be explained through different
factors some of which have been examined in the literature of determinants of international
soccer success. One variable previous studies did not investigate closely is Corruption.
Studies conducted on the determinants of success in association soccer have not focused
solely on the African continent, but included samples of the whole world. In most cases, some of
the African nations were omitted from analysis due to lack of data at the time of the study, or
because it spans back further than the data exists for some of the countries. The studies looked at
the impact of wealth, talent pool, soccer culture, institutions, and colonialism among other
variables on soccer performance. The majority of studies confirm the positive impact of wealth
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on performance, while some finds a positive relationship of talent pool conditional on the culture
of the country examined. By focusing solely on African nations, this paper investigates if the
variables found to be significant in past studies hold the same implication when it comes to
African teams.
While recent studies analyze essential factors to understand the world soccer order, a more
focused approach on the continent can provide us with a better insight into what shapes
performances of African teams. Consequently, in this paper attempts to explore the impact of
corruption on association soccer in the continent, as well as, examine the determinants of
association soccer success of Africa’s teams. To do so, a regression analysis of cross sectional
data from the year 2006 is utilized. Analyzing corruption in the context of soccer in Africa
informs us not just on its impact on performance, but also about the extent to which corruption is
ingrained in national institutions.
In line with past studies, this paper’s results confirm the positive impact of wealth on
performance. At early stages of development, soccer did not receive much care. However, as
nations developed and capital became less scarce, more and more capital was devoted to the
sport, thus elevating the quality of soccer in the given country. Additionally, as in previous
studies, test outcomes also show that talent pool has no significant impact on performance.
Furthermore, corruption as measured by the World Economic Forum index, Diversion of public
funds, does not carry statistical significance in determining performance. However, the
relationship of Wealth with performance might explain performance’s relationship with
corruption, since wealth is usually correlated with corruption. Additional details from the tests
are discussed more thoroughly in the results section.
BACKGROUND
To understand the state of African Soccer today, it is important to discuss some of the
crucial realities of the game in the continent. In this section I will provide a background of
African soccer, exploring multiple aspects of the game in the continent. Firstly, I will explore the
diffusion of soccer in Africa, focusing on its colonial history and early stages of development.
Secondly, I will highlight the Impact of soccer on reflecting the social and political realms of the
various stages of the sport in Africa, as well as follow the development of the sport as a political
tool in the continent. Then, in the following section I will review the literature on the
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determinants of Association soccer success and their implications on the continent.
Diffusion of Soccer in Africa
The diffusion of the sport in the African continent dates back to the colonial period. In his
book African Soccerscapes, historian and professor at Michigan State University Peter Alegi
characterizes the early stages of diffusion as ‘white man’s burden’ (Alegi, 2010). The colonizers
took it upon themselves to ‘civilize’ the masses in Africa, to introduce Christianity, and
Europeanize them. Nevertheless, the introduction of the sport to the continent was impacted by
the development of the sport in the home nations of the various colonizers. While soccer culture
was in more developed stages in Britain, it was just starting to catch up in France, Italy, Belgium,
and the rest of the colonizers home nations. For example, In the mid 1800s, British settlers
started to form teams in the colonies. While the first recorded game was in South Africa in 1866,
French settlers started to form clubs in Algeria in the 1890s (Alegi, 2010). Soccer was not free
from the social complexities of the time. Colonial racism, which was an integral part of the
colonizers approach to the colonial subjects, was reflected in soccer. According to Alegi, “white
teams enjoyed access to adequate playing facilities built with African taxes, a privilege not
afforded to colonial subjects” (Alegi, 2010). Later on, railway and development in urban centers
across the continent brought more people into the game.
Soccer’s growing popularity in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, and with the heightened
activities within independence movements, was seen as a tool at the hands of independence
leaders to grasp the support of the masses (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). Reflecting the anticolonial tensions was the intercolonial games which was evident in French Africa. The
commencement of the French West Africa Cup in 1947 brought various teams from across west
Africa to compete for the cup. With the growing numbers of teams and intensity of rivalry, the
competition was the field for the evolving national identities expressed by the various groups.
The increased rivalries went against wishes of the French, as they hoped the sport would serve as
a platform to unite the regions and distract them from the political environment surrounding
other colonies (Alegi 2010).
The African leadership at the time did not just use the sport to put Africa on the map, but
also as a mean to gain support for their political agendas (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). Ever
since, soccer in the continent has been used as a political tool by some governments as a way of
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diffusing tensions, as it is used by governments around the world. Additionally, Soccer grasped
the “imagination of diverse populations” as they came out of colonialism, and thus it was subject
to “political interference and economic exploitation” (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). However,
in many instances soccer was used as way to unify the nation and thus easing tensions in postcivil war situation, such as in Ivory coast after it came out of its first civil war which devastated
the country for 5 years (Bloomfield, 2010). Regional political rivalry fuels the intensity of
games. Examples of that intensity can be seen in the disputes aroused between Sudan and Chad
in 2006 prior to a scheduled soccer game. The Game was later played in a neutral ground, Cairo
(Bloomfield; 2010). This goes to show the significance of soccer as a political tool and a
potentially a catalyst for political transformation.
Soccer and Identity in Africa
As nations started to form and nationalistic movements sprang up around the globe in the
mid nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, people started to ask themselves: what
does it mean to belong to their country? The ethnic, religious, and racial diversity of the various
nations around the world made it hard for people to unite under one name, one flag. One thing
people seemed to come around is their national soccer team. When the national team plays,
everyone gets behind it. To them, their team represented them, their ideals, and a victory to their
team was a victory to their nation as they perceived it. Soccer both constructs national identity
and is constructed by nationalistic ideals of the respective country (Dubois, 2010). In his book
Soccer Empire, Dubois (2010) analysis the usage of soccer in Algeria as a tool for resistance and
expressing anti-colonialist sentiments, thus reflecting the political and social climate of the time.
In the late 1940s, the FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) established a soccer team in Algeria
as a form of resistance to French colonialism. They played games in Eastern Europe and Asia as
a way to grasp global support and to raise attention to the movement. When Algerian players
playing for French national team were called to represent the FLN, they agreed. For the FLN this
exhibited the support they have in Algeria and abroad and served as a sanction on the French
national team, by denying France “the services of key players” (Alegi, 2010). The waving flags,
chants, and national anthem were all present wherever the team played (Dubois, 2010; Alegi,
2010). The body of literature links soccer with national identity (Giulianotti, 1999), and
globalization (Foer, 2004).
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Soccer also served as a preliminary inauguration of foreign policy for the newly
independent African nations (Darby, 2002). In the African continent and by the time countries
started to gain their independence, they started to join various international organizations, such
as the United Nations, and also in sports such as the International Olympic Committee, and
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). The increased presence of African
membership in FIFA, prompted the leaders of African Soccer Associations to form the CAF
(Confederation Africaine de Football). Founded in 1957 by Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South
Africa, the CAF acts as a governing body for African soccer and represents the continent as one
of the six continental federations under the FIFA. Furthermore, the CAF is divided into 5 regions
(West, North, East, Central, South).
Early on when African nations joined the CAF after gaining their independence, they
started to experience first attempts at regional cooperation. Aside from the African Union and
other regional organizations, the CAF gave African leaders a test at combating post colonialist
and racist systems embedded throughout the colonial past of the continent. An example of the
success of regional cooperation came at the collective push to suspend the membership of South
Africa in the FIFA as well as in the CAF, in part of fighting the apartheid system at the time. The
suspension of South Africa was at the heart of the FIFA 1974 presidential election. This election
presented the prowess of the African nations vote, considering their share of votes. The
‘Havelange vs. Rous’ election culminated at securing the African vote. While the incumbent
Rous insisted on opposing the suspension of the South African soccer association, Havelange
traveled through Africa marketing for his anti-apartheid approach (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998;
Darby, 2001; Alegi, 2010). Later on, Havelange instituted measures to assist qualified African
nations to the World Cup, as well as initiating youth development programs in the continent.
Although, some view Havelange as a champion of African soccer, others view him as a
politician banking on the votes of African nations.
Havelange’s relationship with African Associations started to dwindle by the end of his
term. In the late 1990s, Havelange, in an attempt to ‘boost his popularity’ in the continent, started
to hint at a potential hosting of World Cup finals by an African nation in 2006, more specifically
South Africa. The move enraged the UEFA who were intending at supporting a European
candidate to host the tournament. After FIFA’s move to award the 1994 World Cup finals
hosting to US at the expense of Morocco, Havelange tried to appeal to the African nations by
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offering up what is seen as a conciliatory move, the hosting of the 1995 U-20 World cup to
Nigeria. Later, FIFA reneged their decision and transferred the hosting rights to Qatar, citing
health concerns in Nigeria, as well as difficulties of securing health insurance by some European
soccer associations. To mend the wounds, Havelange promised to give Nigeria the right to host
the 1997 version of the u-20 tournament. This move resulted in a backlash, when the Asian
federation where surprised that Malaysia’s given rights to host the tournament were rescinded
(Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998; Darby, 2002). Nigeria ended up hosting the 1999 version of the
tournament.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Determinants of International Soccer Success
In recent years, political and sports economists started to explore the determinants of
international soccer performance. Those researchers have primarily utilized statistical measures
to understand the impact of potentially influential variables on international soccer performance.
These studies employed multivariable regression tests using international soccer data to
empirically test out the effects of each potential factor. It is important to note that these studies
use different measures of team performance as the dependent variable in their regressions. While
Kuper and Szymanski (2010) use goal difference and winning percentage as an indicator of team
performance in one of their tests, Hoffmann et al. (2002) and Leeds and Leeds (2010) use the
Coca-Cola FIFA ranking as a proxy, and Gasquez and Royuela (2016) use ELO rankings. The
benefit of these measures is that they are comprehensive when it comes to the total of games
played by a given team, however, they include friendly games which do not carry the same rate
of competitiveness that usually accompanies a soccer tournament such as the World Cup. The
ELO and recently the FIFA rankings have approached this problem by quantifying the
performance of a given national team by assigning different weights to the different types of
games, making it more accurate in measuring national team performances.
Throughout these tests, patterns started to appear confirming some of the theories about
international soccer. For example, economic performance, as measured by GDP per capita
exhibits a positive relationship with international soccer team performances (Hoffmann et al,
2002; Torgler, 2004; Kuper and Szymanski, 2010; Leeds, M and Leeds, E 2009; Gasquez and
Royuela, 2016). However, Hoffmann et. al (2002), using GNP per capita, concluded that as an
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economy develops its national team performance improves but then it diminishes as the nation
approaches a certain level of income then start to go down. The authors attribute this relationship
to soccer being a “capital un-intensive sport” (Hoffmann et al, 2002); all you need is a ball and
space. Additionally, as families get richer, they can afford other forms of entertainment reducing
playing time, and thus greater wealth could harm a
countries’ performance. This relationship has been
confirmed by the succeeding studies on measuring
determinants of success (Torgler, 2004; Leeds and
Leeds, 2009, Gasquez and Royuela, 2016). Overall,
tests show the more resourceful a nation is the better
it performs (Kuper and Szymanski, 2010).!
Resources are essential to national teams’

Figure'1:!relationship!between!wealth!and!
FIFAranking!(Hoffmann!et!al.,2002)

!

performances; the more resourceful a country is, the better it is equipped to excel on the field
(Kuper and Szymanski, 2010). Resourcefulness of a country translates into its financial
capability, size of the talent pool, and experience playing and managing the game. In most
studies, talent pool measured through population size, does not exhibit a statistically significant
impact on performance (Kuper and Szymanski, 2010; Leeds M and Leeds E, 2009; Hoffman et.
al, 2002; Torgler, 2004), on the other hand, one study shows a statistically significant impact of
population size, when measured in a panel data setting (Gasquez and Royuela, 2016). In the
other studies, only when culture was considered, the population size exhibited a statistically
significant impact. For example, Hoffmann et al. (2002) included an interaction term in their
model which indicates the impact of population growth, when the country considered is of Latin
background. In Latin countries, the larger the population is, the better its nation perform.
Hoffman et al. concluded that countries with weak soccer culture tend to have other competing
sports. These competing sports absorb a fraction of population growth which then makes
population size insignificant in determining the talent pool.
Another essential variable when it comes to resources is experience, as measured through
number of games played by the national team. The significance of this relationship can be seen
through a simple comparison between England and Senegal. England played their first game in
1892, while Senegal played theirs in 1961; the latter has a higher ELO rating than the former.
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Greater experience yields better performance (Kuper and Szymanski, 2010).
Apart from countries’ resources, political factors such as communism, freedom, colonial
heritage, oil production, and OECD membership have shown some impact on teams as shown in
a study (Leeds M and Leeds E, 2009). The authors find that communism is negatively related to
performance. They also find that former colonies tend to underperform relative to their
colonizers (Leeds M and Leeds E, 2009). These results reflect Kuper and Szymanski’s
comparison of challenges facing international soccer to the theories expressed by development
economists. Import substitution, the importance of networks and connectivity, and openness to
innovation are all factors apparent in development of soccer globally (Kuper and Szymanski,
2010).
These empirical studies highlight some of the important factors in deciding the world
soccer order. However, they do not take into consideration some of the factors that may be
significant to African soccer performance, such as corruption of soccer associations. In this
paper, controlling for the essential factors suggested in the literature, corruption will be assessed
as a determinant factor of soccer performance. Apart from corruption which is the main focus of
this paper, colonial heritage, regional affiliation, and migration, are all variables worth exploring
in analyzing the performances of African national teams.
Hurdles in the Development of Soccer in Africa
African nations face similar hurdles to those faced by other developing nations.
Nevertheless, the level at which these hurdles exist in Africa is impeding. The heart of all these
obstacles can be summarized in the following statement:
“Extreme poverty is the most serious obstacle to the development of
football in Africa and regularly countries are forced to withdraw from
international competitions because national federations do not have the
money to send their teams abroad…The financial misery of African
football is accentuated through the corruption which so often goes hand
in hand with the administration of football on the continent” (Sugden and
Tomlinson, 1998).

According to the authors, Sugden and Tomlinson (1998), Corruption is referred to as the cancer
of African soccer. The popularity of the game in Africa makes it an attractive source of financial
gains through “sponsorship deals, television contracts, gate receipts and government officials”
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capitalizing on all these potential sources of income (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). Politics
surrounding African soccer is resembled in what the author Jean Bayart calls the ‘politics of the
belly’, a term used to describe the patronage systems in Africa (See Bayart, 2010).
Assessing factors introduced by the literature on determinants of soccer success in relation
to Africa help us put things into perspective. In addition to economic standing relationship with
performance, talent pool in the continent is another potential variable that might prove to have an
effect on performance. According to FIFA’s 2006 ‘Big Count’, the majority of players in the
continent, who constitute 17% of total players in the world, are not properly registered at the
soccer association of their respective countries (See FIFA Big count. 2006). Nevertheless, the
size of population in itself is not enough to explain the quality of the talent pool. An important
factor that differentiates richer economies from poorer ones, is the health of their populations.
Kuper and Szymanski (2010) highlight in their analysis the impact of malnutrition on the
physical attributes of athletes thus preventing them from reaching their potential. Consequently,
the authors claim that countries with a bigger ratio of stunted players tend to underperform.
Steven Pienaar, the south African star player who grew up in a colored township in the era of
apartheid is known for his “prepubescent boy” body figure (Kuper and Syzmanski, 2010). This
phenomenon is not uncommon in the South African team. They argue that “most likely, Pienaar
is reedy because he grew up malnourished and without much access to doctors” (Kuper and
Szymanski, 2010).
The debate about why African teams perform poorly is an ongoing one within the soccer
community, not just within the continent, but globally as well, since the best African players
feature in top flight soccer in Europe. Yaya Touré, an Ivorian star who plays at the top level in
Europe, who won African player of the year three consecutive times, has never won the English
premier league player of year award, let alone player of the month, nor did his Ivorian
counterpart Didier Drogba. Yaya Touré frustratingly stated that African players don't get as
much recognition as they should. He received criticism shortly after his statement (Muller,
2014). On the other hand, the former CAF president and senior vice president of FIFA, said that
the top players, who usually play in Europe, underperform when playing for their national team,
afraid of being injured and thus decreasing their market value (FAIR Investigative team, 2010).
Former England star John Barnes referred to the same issue indicating that there’s a mental
tweak which exists in African players, he claimed that “Africans must show the same desire and
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discipline when playing for their country that they do when playing for European clubs” (Muller,
2014).
Corruption In African Soccer
The literature lacks thorough analysis of corruption in African soccer and the dynamics
that accompany it. Some of the studies done on African soccer discuss the role of corruption in
the maladministration of the sport (Pannenborg, 2010). Some suggest that the level of corruption
led to the failure in combatting issues facing the sport in Africa, such as the exodus of African
talent to Europe (Darby, 2007). One paper in particular addresses directly the relational
operations between corruption and underdevelopment of soccer in Africa (Chiweshe, 2014).
Chiweshe draws mainly from a 2010 investigative report on multiple incidents of corruption in
African soccer across various countries (FAIR Investigative team, 2010). Talking about
corruption can be hard due to the vagueness of the term in relation to soccer. Therefore, I
mention some of the incidents cited in the literature, and in the following section I explain how
can corruption influence performance.
Corruption in soccer is not solely an African problem, “match fixing, bribing officials,
[rigged] player transfers [and] sponsorship deals” are all incidents that have been occurring
regularly on the international level (Chiweshe, 2014). However, the scope in which corruption
exists in African soccer denies the sport from developing and the national teams from performing
better on both the regional and international levels. Chiweshe (2014) mentions that incidents
such as “missing funds…presidents who serve for decades, underpaid players, [and] poor
infrastructure” have all been encountered multiple times. In 2010 the Forum for African
Investigative Reporters (FAIR) published a report underpinning corruption incidents which had
taken place in the past.
According to the same report, in 2009, officials from the Ivorian football federation had
sold 2000 more tickets than the capacity of the Felix Hophouëet stadium (35,000) for the World
Cup qualifying game against Malawi. The fraudulent selling of the extra tickets resulted in a
stampede which claimed the lives of 20 fans as well as injured another 135. Additionally, the
authors cite incident of stolen funds. For example, in the 1998 World cup, the Cameroonian
minister of communication who was supposed to carry the players’ allowances to France where
the World Cup was held, claimed to have lost the bag in the aircraft; the money was never seen
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since (FAIR Investigative Team, 2010).

MODEL AND DATA
In this paper, I use multivariable OLS regression tests to examine the impact of
determinants of association soccer success in Africa. More specifically, I conduct a crosssectional regression test, using data from the year 2006. The choice of the year 2006 was due to
the availability of accurate data on the talent pool variable which I will discuss further. The
variables choice is taken mainly from the determinants of International Soccer performance
literature. These variables measure a variety of factors such as wealth, talent pool, experience,
colonial heritage, and regional affiliation. To these variables, corruption is included.
First of all, the sources of the data will be discussed, how they are measured and how can
they potentially explain some of the variation in performances. Then I will delve into the
methodology and the model specification. Finally, the results from the regression tests will be
discussed, including potential implications around them.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in this study, which is used to measure team performance in a
given year, is the ELO Soccer ratings. The ELO was first introduced in the game of chess, but
has been used more recently as a more reliable indicator of Soccer team performance. Examining
the predicting power of ELO rating, Hvattum and Arntzen (2010) concluded that results justify
the use of ELO as a measurement of team strength. Royuela and Gazquez (2010), cite the study
and advise future research to use it as a proxy for team performance. While FIFA’s measuring
criteria has not been consistent through the years, as of recently, they have adapted a framework
of assessment which takes account of the strength of the opponent, and the tournament which the
game is played at. The ELO uses a similar set of criteria. Most studies have used FIFA or ELO
ratings to measure team performance of a given team (Leeds, M and Leeds, E 2009; Gasquez and
Royuela, 2010), while Syzmanski and Kuper (2010) used winning percentage and goal
difference in their book Socccernomics. For the regression test, which is a cross sectional
regression that utilizes data from 2006, this paper looks into the ratings of 51 countries of the 54
African nations. The three omitted countries are: South Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome
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Principe. These countries were not included due to the shortage of data. See table N, and figure 4
for the list of countries included in the tests.
Table 1: The list of countries included in analysis and their ELO ratings. (See
www.eloratings.net: )
Team!
Cameroon!
Nigeria!
Ivory!Coast!
Ghana!
Egypt!
Morocco!
Senegal!
Tunisia!
Angola!
Guinea!
Mali!
Zambia!
South!Africa!
DR!Congo!
Zimbabwe!
Libya!
Togo!
Burkina!Faso!
Algeria!
Ethiopia!
Uganda!
Gabon!
Sudan!
Congo!
Gambia!
!

ELO!rating!of!African!Nations!(2006)!
ELO!rating!
Team!
1780!
Cape!Verde!
1776!
Kenya!
1765!
Malawi!
1746!
Niger!
1717!
Tanzania!
1648!
Botswana!
1648!
Rwanda!
1633!
Sierra!Leone!
1589!
Mozambique!
1578!
Benin!
1548!
Liberia!
1545!
Mauritius!
1472!
Burundi!
1472!
Chad!
1459!
CAR!
1440!
Namibia!
1431!
Mauritania!
1421!
Swaziland!
1416!
Madagascar!
1402!
Equatorial!Guinea!!
1393!
Eritrea!!
1388!
Lesotho!
1370!
Seychelles!
1366!
Somalia!
1347!
Comoros!
Djibouti!!

ELO!rating!
1328!
1316!
1313!
1306!
1305!
1301!
1300!
1295!
1279!
1276!
1271!
1262!
1262!
1250!
1218!
1205!
1190!
1184!
1180!
1178!
1131!
1121!
1118!
945!
871!
805!

.
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Figure 2: Countries included in analysis (www.mapchart.net: )

Wealth
For measuring wealth of a given country, this paper uses GDP per capita as an indicator
of a country’s economic standing. Previous studies have consistently used GDP per capita
variable to measure the impact of wealth on the performance of national teams (Hoffmann et al.,
2002; Torgler, 2004; Kuper and Szymanski, 2010; Leeds, M and Leeds, E 2009; Gasquez and
Royuela, 2016). Alongside the positive relationship between wealth and performance, these
studies have observed a diminishing return of performance in respect to wealth. That is, as
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countries develop, they perform better, but at a diminishing pace, until a certain point where
performance start to go down (a U inverted relationship). This relationship is attributed to the
capital un-intensity nature of soccer; starting at low income levels, soccer functions as a leisure
activity that is affordable and thus kids spend more time playing it. However, as families get
richer, they start to provide other kinds of leisure activities to their kids reducing playing time
(Hoffman et al 2002). Additionally, Richer countries have more resources to invest in the
development of the sport. From initiating youth academies, to building infrastructure, these
essential steps to the development of the sport require the country to be financially more capable.
To measure the impact of GDP per capita on performance, first the variable is linearized
by taking its natural log [Ln(GDP)]. Any increase in Ln(GDP) will be interpreted as a percentage
increase instead of a unit increase. Then, to test the inverted U relationship between wealth and
performance, the variable is squared ["#(%&')]2 . Since my observations are 51 countries from
the African continent, a strong U inverted relationship is not anticipated, but a diminishing return
relationship is. For the former, a positive relationship is expected.
Talent pool
Another important variable that has been subject to different results in different studies is
talent pool. Most of these studies have used population size as a proxy to talent pool. The
intuition is that the bigger your population is, the bigger your talent pool from which you select
your team. Population size have showed statistically significant impacts in some studies (Kuper
and Szymanski, 2010; Leeds, M and Leeds, E 2009; Gasquez and Royuela, 2010) and
statistically insignificant in others (Hoffman et al. 2002). However, in 2006 FIFA released a
table including the total number of registered soccer players in a given country, as part of their
‘big count’ project which aims at measuring the number of players worldwide (See FIFA big
count, 2006). I utilize this available source in my cross-sectional regression test which uses data
from the same year of the ‘big count’ report, 2006. In earlier studies, population size did not
present a statistically significant impact. Hoffman et al. (2002) attribute this to the fact that,
relative to the world, populous countries such as China, India, and the US are not successful at
the sport. Further into their paper, they state that culture is a vital factor in determining success.
Thus, as a population grow in size, other sports that are more popular in other countries (e.g.
Cricket in India, Basketball, football, and baseball in the US…etc.) absorbs most of that growth.
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Therefore, the more popular competing sports there are in a given country, the less impact
population size will have on soccer performance.
Nevertheless, the variable used to measure talent pool in the model is the Number of
players in the given country’s soccer association. The expected relationship between talent pool
(denoted as NumPlayers in the model) and ELO points is a positive one; the more players there
are in a given country, the bigger the talent pool is and thus, the better a country performs.
Team experience
African nations have gained their independence, for the most part, in the 1960s;
Thereafter, they started to join international and regional bodies such as the United Nations and
the African Union. They started to form soccer national teams and compete against other nations.
The amount of years a given national team has been playing as a nation in the international
venue varies throughout the continent. This variation is due to the different years in which the
national teams started to form. Thus, teams that have been involved in games longer than others
carry more expansive experience. Experience have showed up in Syzmanski and Kuper’s (2010)
analysis an element indicating resources to a country’s performance. Alongside wealth and
population, they consider experience, using the number of games played by each nation,
concluding the statistical significance impact of experience on performance. The relationship
between experience and performance can suffer from endogeneity, since winning games
qualifies you to further stages of various competitions, thus increasing the number of games
played. Another way of measuring experience can be the number of years since the soccer
association was established and active. When it comes to Africa, this is not a perfect
measurement, due to the frequency of conflicts in some nations which prevents them from
playing games and thus gaining experience. Because of all these complications to measuring
experience, I decided to exclude the variable from my regression test.
Colonial heritage
Colonial heritage has been examined by Leeds and Leeds (2010). Colonialism resembles
a central role in the diffusion of the game in the continent, let alone most of the developing
world. While British colonizers brought the game in earlier than others, French, Portuguese,
Belgian and others, have all followed thereafter (Alegi, 2010; Darby, 2002). This discrepancy in
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diffusion of the game among European colonizers can be attributed to the various pace at which
the game developed in the colonizers’ home nations. While soccer was strictly introduced to the
African elite educated in British schools, the game spread rapidly throughout the cities and
elsewhere. The impact of colonial heritage can be captured in the model using a dummy variable
for each colony. Here it is examined as to how the development of the game per the colonizers’
time and way of diffusion affect the performance. Expected results from this variable can be that
countries with British colonial tradition might experience a boost in their performance due to the
earlier diffusion of the game than other colonies.
Corruption
The connection between corruption and performance is not as clear as that of wealth and
performance, which then can make it tricky to measure. However, in this paper I attempt to
categorize the kinds of impact corruption might have on performance and explain how I measure
it. Corruption can impact performance directly and indirectly. Directly through match fixing,
where the game results are predetermined through bribing officials, or either sides of the game
to, for example, concede a goal or more goals. However, indirect impacts can come in the shape
of missed or lost funds, unpaid allowances to players, incident of stampedes, all of which might
potentially impact the mentality of players and thus performance.
Pay scandals, match fixing allegations, and player disputes has always been marred with
African teams’ participation in the World Cup. Three of the five teams participating in the latest
World Cup in 2014 have been involved in corruption schemes. Prior to the tournament’s kick
off, Cameroonian players refused to board the plane, protesting unpaid allowances. Additionally,
Ghana had to fly $3M USD in cash to Brazil, when players threatened to boycott the match
demanding their “appearance fees” (FAIR Investigative team, 2010). The World Cup is not the
only venue in which this act is repeated, but at the regional level corruption has become
normalized in the game. Needless to say, corruption in soccer is not an African issue and it is at
the core of the world soccer governance, FIFA. However, the size and significance in which
corruption appears in the continent is astounding. There are no indices that measure corruption at
the soccer association level. Yet, there are various investigative journalism reports that document
some of the incidents that took place in the last 20 years. Usually, players are offered bonuses
and allowances for representing their countries in regional and international competitions as an
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incentive. These allowances are often given in the form of cash. Thus, officials representing the
soccer associations would fly with the team holding bags of cash. This cash is then disappeared.
This anecdote has been repeated over and over again (FAIR Investigative team, 2010).
Additionally, the funding of development programs and national teams’ participation came not
just from private companies but the government as well. Therefore, to measure the impact of
corruption on performance, incidents of reported corruption were first gathered. A limitation to
this method is that not all countries have reported incidents. Nevertheless, a relationship between
incidents of corruption and a corruption index is established, and therefore the index is used as a
proxy for corruption at the soccer association level.
To measure the corruption of soccer associations, the reported incident of corruption,
mainly from the 2010 Forum of African Investigative Reporters (FAIR) report, were collected.
For each incident of corruption reported in a given year the country is given a point. The more
points the country has, the more corruption incidents are reported for that country in a given
year. It is also important to note that, due to the limited number of countries with reported
incidents, observations are restricted to the countries with at least one reported incident of
corruption. After collecting these incidents, a state level corruption index was regressed on the
reported incidents. For the indices, a more general index, such as the CPI, which through
averaging results from multiples surveys captures a general sense of corruption in a given
country at a given year, was chosen (See Transperancy.org). For my second index, I chose the
World Economic Forum diversion of public funds, which is a more detailed index measuring the
diversion of public funds to groups or individuals (See World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness report 2006). The diversion of public funds index is measured on a 0-100 scale,
with 100 being free of any diversion of public funds, and 0 the opposite. Corruption of soccer
association can come in different shapes. More often, this would be a pocketing of funds from
the government, or from a big national company such as an oil company or a telecom giant. The
worse a country is in managing public funds through its diversion, the less resources are
efficiently directed to the soccer association and thus the development of the sport. There are
multiple reasons why this might not be an accurate measurement. Firstly, these reported
incidents are of only 7 countries of the 51 observed, and thus might suffer from
misrepresentation. Secondly, these only include the reported incidents and not the ones that went
unnoticed or unreported in national or international news outlets. Furthermore, after regressing
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the number of reported incidents on the chosen indices, the coefficient, although statistically
significant, is not big enough (^0.0106) to have a definite impact on actual reported incidents of
corruption.
Table'2:!Description!of!variables!and!their!notation!in!the!models!

Variable

Notation

National Team
performance:

ELOpoints

ELO ratings

Population Size
GDP per capita
A dummy variable for the
country’s historical
colonizer

Diversion of Public
Funds
Number of players
registered at the Soccer
Association of a given
country
A dummy variable
representing the region
which each team is
located in

pop
gdp
∑ &+,,-./"/#-:
-! French!
-! British !
-! Portuguese!
-! Spanish !
PubDiver
NumPlayers

∑ &+,,-0123/#:
-! North!
-! West !
-! East!
-! South!
-! Central

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To analyze the impact of the various variables on performance, I construct a model that
examine performance as a function of wealth, talent pool, corruption, colonial heritage, and
regional affiliation. The general expected relationship is projected with the sign preceding the
variables, hence the negative sign preceding corruption.
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'145/4,6#71 = 916":ℎ + =6"1#:>?//" − 7/44+?3:3/# + ./"/#36">ℎ143:621 +
(1)!

0123/#6">6553"36:3/#
!

Before delving into the results, a description is given here for the model specification. I use a
cross sectional OLS regression test using data from the year 2006. My model specification shows
ELO points as a function of a linearized GDP per capita variable (lgdp), a dummy variable
representing the different colonial heritage (Assigning a value of 1 if the country belonged to an
X colonial heritage and 0 if it didn’t), the number of registered players In a given country
(NumPlayers), corruption measured through Diversion of public funds index (PubDiver), a
dummy variable representing the regional affiliation of a given country Assigning a value of 1 if
the country belonged to an X region and 0 if it didn’t) and the error term

.

ABC?/3#:DE> = FG + >FH "2I?E> + FJ "2I?2E> +
FL ∑ &+,,-./"/#-E (541#7ℎ, ?/4:/, N43:, N1"2, O:6) + FP Q+,'"6-14DE> + FR '+S&3T14E>> +
FL ∑ &+,,-0123/#E (Q/4:ℎ, 91D:, A6D:, .1#:46", U/+:ℎ) + > VE ! !

!

!

(2)!

!
A summary of the variables shows that the average of ELO points of the 51 countries
included is 1363.922, with a minimum of 805 and 1780. This would become increasingly
important when interpreting the regression results, since we will be able to observe how many
points each variable contributes to the ELO points.
To observe the robustness of the results, four regression tests were run, looking at the
different variables together and individually. First of all, we can observe a positive relationship
between GDP per capita and ELO points. Although the first and the fourth test do not present
statistical significance, the 2nd and 3rd tests do so. Specifically, the 3rd model indicates that a 1
percent increase in GDP leads to 7.16 additional ELO points, while the third tests indicate that a
1 percent increase in GDP results in 9.53 additional ELO points. The results confirm the wealth
effect from past studies. Past studies have consistently found a positive relationship between the
two. More specifically, Royuela and Gasquez (2016) findings on the significance of the impact
of GDP per capita on ELO points is reflected here. The wealthier the country is, the better it
performs. This can be explained by the increased pool of resources from which a country can
invest in its soccer organizations. Furthermore, the squared natural log of GDP per capita
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variable confirms the inverted U relationship with performance. This, according to Hoffmann et
al. (2002) explains the capital un-intensity nature of soccer. An interpretation of the huge boost
an extra percentage increase in GDP per capita has, is the fact that the countries included in the
analysis have a bigger return on income growth, since they start at a lower level of income. This
can be seen through the U inverted relationship that income has with soccer performance
Table 3: Statistical summary of variables

log of GDP per capita variable confirms the inverted U relationship with performance.
This, according to Hoffmann et al. (2002) explains the capital un-intensity nature of soccer. An
interpretation of the huge boost an extra percentage increase in GDP per capita has, is the fact
that the countries included in the analysis have a bigger return on income growth, since they start
at a lower level of income. This can be seen through the U inverted relationship that income has
with soccer performance.
The results also indicate that corruption as measured by the World Economic Forum
index, diversion of public funds, show no statistically significant impact on ELO ratings. This
result can be due to either the inaccuracy of the index in measuring the soccer association
corruption incidents, or that corruption does not have an impact on players performance on the
field. Either way, the relationship between wealth and performance can potentially explain the
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one between corruption and performance, given the observed relationship between economic
growth and corruption (Mo, 2001). Furthermore, since I’m focusing on the indirect impact of
corruption presented mainly on the players mentality approaching the game, the results might
miss the direct impact of corruption on the game, which is reflected by the match fixing
incidents. However, that is unlikely since the ELO points put more weight on the official games
which are overseen by international or regional bodies and thus less susceptible to match fixing.
The first possibility can be explained through the regression on the relationship between
actual incidents of corruption and the diversion of public funds index, which was constructed to
justify the use of the index as a proxy for corruption of soccer association. The regression results
were not big enough to indicate a strong relationship, albeit its statistical significance. Referring
back to the two ways in which corruption might occur in soccer associations, diversion of public
funds is meant to measure the incidents related to missing funds and unpaid allowances to
players both of which are potentially connected to performance in an indirect manner.
The other explanation is that corruption does not carry much importance when it comes
to performing well on the field. Some might argue that players patriotism in representing their
country comes first, and whether their promised allowances are given to them or is lost, they
would not slack in playing for their country. While this argument might draw attention to what
impact performance on the individual player level, it is important to acknowledge the economic
importance of practicing the sport for many, not just in Africa, but all over the world.
Finally, colonial heritage and regional affiliation do not generally possess any statistical
significance, but vary among regions and areas of different colonial histories. This gives an
insight on what is thought to be a regional superiority of excelling in the sport. Although it might
seem that countries belonging to west and north Africa perform better than the other regions, on
average, no region seem to have an advantage over another.
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Table 4: OLS regression results
!!
!
lgdp!
!
NumPlayers!
!
lgdp2!
!
PubDiver!
!
French!

(1)!
ELOrating!
16.41!
(23.58)!
0.0000853***!
(0.0000228)!
!

Porto!

!

Brit!

!

belg!

!

ita!

!

North!
!
West!
!
East!
!
South!
!
Central!
!
_cons!
!!
N!
R^sq!

!

="*!p<0.05!

!
!

(2)!
ELOrating!
716.7*!
(297.7)!
0.0000603**!
(0.0000201)!
^49.27*!
(20.78)!
^0.847!
(1.261)!

(3)!
ELOrating!
952.7*!
(392.8)!
0.0000670**!
(0.0000218)!
^66.40*!
(26.89)!
^0.160!
(1.461)!
19.26!
(173.1)!
^60.65!
(197.0)!
^83.28!
(165.1)!
^8.873!
(168.7)!
210.1!
(247.2)!

!
!
!
!
1178.6***!
(165.4)!
51!
0.230!

^1148.5!
^1941.6!
(1054.3)!
(1321.4)!
40!
40!
0.362!
0.445!
Standard!errors!in!parentheses!
!**!p<0.01!
!***!p<0.001"!
!

(4)!
ELOrating!
504.1!
(298.4)!
0.0000575*!
(0.0000230)!
^34.83!
(20.64)!
^0.990!
(1.234)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
236.0!
(183.6)!
162.3!
(195.5)!
38.07!
(200.0)!
25.14!
(191.3)!
135.7!
(205.3)!
^485.5!
(1068.9)!
40!
0.520!
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Figure 3: The relationship between number of players and ELO rating

Figure 4. Relationship between number of years since soccer association founded and ELO
ratings
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CONCLUSION
The results exhibited in this study confirm the previous findings in the literature when it
comes to the impact of wealth on performance, but contrary to some studies, size of the talent
pool as measured by the number of players in a given soccer association does carry statistical
significance. Furthermore, colonial heritage, and regional affiliation do not have a statistically
significant impact on performance. Corruption which is the core term for this paper, does not
possess any statistical significance in determining performance. However, the relationship
between wealth and performance can explain the impact of corruption on performance, since
income is usually associated with corruption.
This study informs us of the current state of African soccer and the factors that are
important in affecting its performance. Further studies should utilize panel data to better
understand not just the overall determinants of performance, but also what explains the trends in
performance. The panel data can also increase the sample size and thus provide more accurate
estimates. This will become easier as more data become more available on Africa.
The literature is in need for more direct discussion of corruption and soccer in Africa.
However, in order to benefit the policy design process, two steps should be taken. First, to
further the accuracy of analysis, a measurement of soccer association institutional performance
should be established. This will record any irregularities in administration of soccer as well as
make soccer association administrators accountable for their actions. Additionally, it will aid the
needed analysis of the relationship between soccer and corruption. This leads me to the second
step, to come up with a comprehensive model in testing the relationship between corruption and
soccer that minimizes statistical issues such as endogeneity.

! 24!
!

REFERENCES
Alegi, P. (2010) ‘African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World’s Game Ohio University
Press
Bayart, J.-F. C. A. (2010). The state in Africa: the politics of the belly. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bloomfield,S. (2010) Africa United: Soccer, Passion, politics, and the First World Cup in
Africa, Canon-gate Books,
Chiweshe, M. (2014) ‘The Problem with African Football Corruption and the
(Under)development of the Game on the Continent, African Sports Law and Business
Review
Darby, P. (2002). Africa, Football and FIFA Politics, Colonialism and Resistance. London: Taylor and
Francis.
Darby, P. (2007). Out Of Africa: The Exodus Of Elite African Football Talent To Europe. WorkingUSA:
The Journal of Labour and Society, 10(4), 443–456. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.17434580.2007.00175.x
Dubois, L., (2011). Soccer empire: the World Cup and the future of France, Berkeley: Univ. Of
California
FIFA. (2006). FIFA Big Count 2006: 270 million people active in football. Retrieved from
https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/bcoffsurv/bigcount.statspackage_7024.pdf
Foer, F., (2010). How soccer explains the world: an unlikely theory of globalization, New York:
Harper Perennial.
Gásquez, R. Royuela, V. (2016). The Determinants of International Football Success: A Panel
Data Analysis of the Elo Rating . Social Science Quartely. Volume 97
Giulianotti, R. (1999). Football: A Sociology of the Football Game. Polity Press, 217.
Hoffman, R., L. C. Ging, and B. Ramasamy. 2002. “The Socio-Economic Determinants of the
International Soccer Performance.” Journal of Applied Economics 5(2):253–72.
Kuper, S. and Szymanski, S. (2014). Soccernomics: Why England Loses, Why Spain, Germany and Brazil
win, and why the U.S, Japan, Australia - and even Iraq Are Destined to Become the Kings of the
World Most Popular Sport, London: HarperSport.
Leeds, M. Leeds, M,E. (2009) International Soccer and National Institutions. Journal of Sports
Economics. Volume, 10 Temple University
Mo, P. H. (2001). Corruption and Economic Growth. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(1),
66–79. http://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2000.1703
Muller, A. (2014, June 11). Why do African teams under-perform at the World Cup? The
Guardian. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/world-cup-africa-football-teams-under-perform
Pannenborg, A. (2010). Football in africa: observations about political, financial, cultural and religious
influences . Amesterdam: NCDO publication series.
Sugden, J and Tomlinson, A. (1998) (FIFA and the Contest for World Football: Who Rules the People’s
Game?
Torgler, B (2004) ‘Historical Excellence In Football World Cup Tournaments’’, Center for
Research in Economics, Management and the Arts,

! 25!
!

